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Four economics students have four different聽problems. One finds it hard to work efficiently聽while also pursuing their extracurricular聽interests. One is concerned that their studies are聽preparing them for a life of service to Mammon聽rather than God. Another is demotivated, lacking聽confidence. The fourth wonders whether they鈥檝e聽just drifted to university because it seemed the done聽thing and that a very different life might be better.聽Each one would like help working through their聽problems. Who should they see?

The most obvious answer is that the first should聽probably seek some kind of coaching, the second聽a chaplain and the third a counsellor or therapist.聽(Henceforth I will simply talk of 鈥榯herapist鈥� and聽鈥榯herapy鈥� but what I say applies equally to counselling聽and counsellors.) The fourth is trickier. In practice,聽the only options would appear to be a chaplain聽(religious or humanist) or a therapist. If such a service聽were available, however, would not a philosopher be聽better than either?

If so, the student is out of luck. There are such聽things as consultant philosophers or philosophical聽counsellors (most notably in a few parts of the US and聽the Netherlands) but they are rare breeds in the UK,聽where there is no such recognised profession. This聽leaves a gap which neither therapy nor chaplaincy聽can easily fill.

The gap opens up whenever a problem of living is聽linked with a set of commitments bound up with聽a comprehensive worldview, implicit or explicit.聽Comprehensive worldviews can be religious beliefs聽or secular philosophies. However, our society lacks聽means of exploring聽these in a systematic,聽critical, philosophical聽way. Chaplains are聽explicitly partisan,聽upholding the ethics聽of a particular religion聽or in some cases secular humanism. Therapists聽tend towards respectful neutrality, believing it聽to be inappropriate to challenge fundamental聽commitments. They may well identify tensions聽within a worldview, or problems created by a聽dissonance between worldview and way of living.聽But for the most part it is not their role to interrogate聽the worldviews themselves, to invite clients to聽explore their coherence and validity. Thus a聽whole set of issues fall into what we might call聽the 鈥榩hilosophy gap鈥�.

Take the economics student who wondered聽whether they had chosen the right path in life.聽It seems more than possible that the client is聽neither depressed nor simply in need of good聽careers advice. The client could be asking grown-up,聽existential questions: what is my life for? What聽gives life meaning and purpose? What does it even聽mean to say life has, or lacks, meaning or purpose?聽Historically, to ask such questions would be seen聽as part and parcel of being an educated, thoughtful聽person, not just a philosopher. Someone gripped聽by these questions would not be suffering from聽a pathology but functioning properly as a聽reflective, responsible, intelligent agent.

It would also be natural for someone deeply聽concerned about these issues to have emotional聽difficulties, even to display some of the 鈥榮ymptoms鈥櫬爋f depression. When we are questioning the value聽of everything, it is easy to temporarily display聽鈥楲oss of interest or pleasure in hobbies and activities鈥櫬燼nd to have 鈥榩ersistent 鈥渆mpty鈥� moods鈥�. A state聽of existential questioning can leave one a little聽鈥榓nxious鈥�, 鈥榟opeless鈥� or 鈥榩essimistic鈥�.¹ One might聽even have 鈥榯houghts of death or suicide, or suicide聽attempts?鈥�¹ Albert Camus famously said in the first聽sentences of The Myth of Sisyphus: 鈥楾here is but one聽truly serious philosophical problem and that is聽suicide. Judging whether life is or is not worth聽living amounts to answering the fundamental聽question of philosophy.鈥�²

Such feelings are not symptoms of a pathology but聽normal signs of a legitimate questioning. These can聽create emotional difficulties, but they are existential,聽not emotional, problems. This makes the standard聽tools of therapy ill-suited to address them. A therapist聽would aim to alleviate the symptoms, either by聽removing their causes or enabling the client to聽work around them. This is the exact opposite of聽how a philosophical approach to the problem would聽proceed. Here, there would be no attempt to deal with聽the symptoms at all. The aim would be to investigate聽the questions that give rise to them. Nor would it聽be assumed that at the end of the process the client聽would feel better. Philosophy pursues the truth,聽not subjective wellbeing.

This point is worth stressing because it is聽occasionally claimed that philosophy is essentially聽therapeutic. This view was popularised by Alain聽de Botton鈥檚 2000 book, The Consolations of Philosophy,^3听and television series. His guiding principle was聽summed up in a quote from Epicurus, the only words to聽appear on the back cover: 鈥楢ny philosopher鈥檚 argument聽which does not therapeutically treat human suffering聽is worthless.鈥� More recently, several have claimed that聽cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) in particular is聽little more than applied Stoicism. Both Aaron Beck,聽founder of CBT, and Albert Ellis, founder of rational聽emotive behavioural therapy (REBT) were influenced聽by Epictetus鈥檚 idea that 鈥業t is not events, but our opinion聽about events, that cause us suffering鈥�.

Such claims are misleading, for several reasons.聽Beck and Ellis were influenced by one of the central聽ideas of Stoicism, but their actual methods owe little聽or nothing to them. In any case, neither the Stoics聽nor Epicurus speak for philosophy as a whole, where聽only a tiny minority of the cannon is therapeutic in聽the contemporary sense.

Indeed, philosophy is potentially more useful聽as a challenge to what 鈥榯herapy鈥� could be than as a聽tool of therapy as it is. The main goal of therapy is聽not to remove all negative affective states but to聽enable normal functioning. This idea goes back to聽Freud, who famously wrote: 鈥�...much has been gained聽if we succeed in turning your hysterical misery into聽common unhappiness.鈥�³ Positive psychology is more聽ambitious in that it is interested in what enables聽optimal levels of subjective wellbeing. Even here,聽however, it is assumed we know what normal聽functioning is and that happiness and subjective聽wellbeing are the goals. Philosophy, however,聽questions what normal functioning is and how聽desirable it ought to be. One of its aims is to articulate聽what a good life should be. Socrates even chose to聽accept his death sentence, killing himself by聽drinking hemlock, rather than violate his聽principles by seeking exile.

Of course, both therapists and chaplains can聽provide some space to explore these existential聽issues. Neither, however, is typically ideally suited聽to doing so. The chaplain is too invested in one聽worldview to lead a genuinely open enquiry.聽The therapist will typically lack knowledge of the聽storehouse of philosophical discussions of these聽issues and will often also be under pressure to聽focus on more measurable wellbeing outcomes.聽Once we become aware of the philosophy gap,聽it can be seen even where other guidance and聽support professionals would seem to have a well-defined聽task. Think again about our economics聽students. One seemed clearly to need a kind of life聽coach. But wouldn鈥檛 it be good to sit and question聽your goals before rushing to find out the most聽efficient ways of achieving them? Similarly,聽someone who would seem to need referring聽to a careers advisor would often benefit from聽thinking through what they take their life to聽be about before committing years of their lives聽to a particular form of work.

Another student seemed in need of a chaplain.聽But if your worldview is in tension with your life聽choices, shouldn鈥檛 you at least consider whether it鈥檚聽your worldview that鈥檚 the problem? A chaplaincy聽would provide little or no opportunity to question聽the religious commitment that is at the source of聽the issue. A therapist would be no more willing to聽go down that particular road. But this is to ignore the聽heart of the problem. A philosophical investigation聽could allow the client to either understand their聽faith differently or聽even abandon it.聽The student who聽was demotivated and聽lacking confidence聽would seem obviously聽to need a therapist, but if聽you lacked a worldview聽that gave meaning and聽value to life, wouldn鈥檛聽you feel somewhat unenthusiastic about living?聽And wouldn鈥檛 that be entirely reasonable? After all,聽in CBT, people try to counter automatic negative聽thoughts, not well-reasoned, well-grounded聽negative thoughts.

The philosophy gap also contributes to the聽trend for existential problems to be approached聽in a medicalised way, even when therapists do not聽overtly adopt a medical paradigm for their work.聽When we do not address the philosophical聽assumptions that underpin worldviews and simply聽accept them as part of the client鈥檚 valid personal,聽ethical commitments, any problems of living the聽client faces that are not explicable entirely by聽external circumstances can only be understood聽as dysfunctions. We ought to consider whether聽they might, in fact, be signs of good functioning,聽seeing things all too clearly.

For those convinced the philosophy gap is real and聽that therapists can play some part in filling it, I would聽commend two broad types of practice (in the awareness聽that some already follow them). The first is to get into聽the habit of questioning whether apparently standard聽psychological problems have important philosophical聽dimensions. For example, anecdotally it seems that聽students are increasingly having problems related聽to perfectionism. It seems that they are surrounded聽by media and social media presenting life for young聽students as being more wonderful than it could ever be聽and so are worried that there is something wrong with聽them because their own social, sexual and emotional聽lives do not live up to this. A therapist could challenge聽the unrealistic nature of some of these expectations.聽In examining how the client would realistically like to聽be, however, I would argue it is not enough to consider聽only the client鈥檚 own wishes and the limits of what is聽possible. It is necessary to go back to philosophical first聽principles and ask what a good life would actually look聽like, questioning the implicit answer society offers.

The therapist can do this too, of course, but is聽hampered by two limitations. The first is a professional聽aversion to discussing issues that might involve making聽value judgments, rather than simply elucidating what聽the client鈥檚 values are. It should be possible, however,聽for a philosophically minded therapist, like a聽consultant philosopher, to present and explore聽philosophical ideas about what is good and bad,聽better or worse, without imposing any particular聽conclusions philosophers have reached on the client.

How far should a client be challenged? A genuine聽philosophical exploration of ideas should challenge聽us, pushing us to assess the arguments for each聽position. In a short therapeutic context, practical聽constraints alone limit how far we can go. Given聽those constraints, it would be tempting for anyone聽keen to introduce a philosophical dimension to聽simply conduct a kind of 鈥榩ick and mix鈥� exercise聽in which different viewpoints are expressed聽and the client chooses which is more congenial.

Such an exercise could be useful but it would聽not fill the philosophy gap. Philosophy embraces聽the value of the 鈥榚xamined life鈥�. This evocative聽phrase, first uttered by Plato鈥檚 Socrates, superficially聽describes the value of therapy too. But the self-examination聽of therapy is different from that of聽philosophy. In therapy, clients seek greater self-awareness聽so as to be able to move on from problems聽interfering with their lives. In philosophy, truth-seekers聽examine not just themselves but the nature聽of human life in general, not merely to overcome聽present difficulties but to understand how best聽to live at any time.

That there is a relationship between the聽examined lives of philosophy and therapy should聽be uncontroversial. To go back to the perfectionism聽example, to understand what it means to be good聽and the limits of our perfectibility, would clearly聽inform any reflection on how good we think our聽own lives are and聽how problematic it is聽that they fall short of聽perfection. It would聽be good if more聽therapeutic encounters聽would make space聽for the philosophical聽side of this problem.

Many other issues聽faced in therapy also have philosophical aspects聽that are often under-explored. Low self-esteem, for聽example, invites the question of what the appropriate聽level of self-esteem actually is. Philosophy can be聽challenging here, since many thinkers have believed聽that human beings are deeply flawed and that it is聽an ongoing challenge to be truly good. Rather than聽learning to 鈥榓ccept ourselves as we are鈥�, which is聽a typical therapeutic aim, we are asked to try to聽become something better. In doing so, however, we聽need not feel bad about ourselves. Falling short is聽human, all too human. It should therefore be possible聽to be in some ways dissatisfied with ourselves聽without being debilitatingly hard on ourselves.聽

Even issues of anxiety and depression have聽philosophical dimensions. Philosophy can help us聽to see that a lot of our negative emotions are rooted聽in tragic realities rather than mistaken cognitions.聽Many philosophies do not comfort us that all our more聽pessimistic thoughts are mistaken. Rather, they tell us聽that it is pointless to wish the world to be other than it is聽and that, with acceptance, it needn鈥檛 be as hard to live in聽as we sometimes make it. The philosophical approach聽to problems of living does not offer any treatments, let聽alone cures. Life is difficult and full of problems, and聽there is no cure for living. This message is arguably聽needed more today than ever before. I believe most聽therapists would be uncomfortable talking of 鈥榗ures鈥�, yet聽one of the least helpful expectations clients have is that聽this is what they will get. The creeping medicalisation聽of therapy only reinforces this false idea. Learning聽to live with the more sober reality could build聽resilience, a character trait which has become much聽more valued in recent years. When you accept that聽life will be full of setbacks and imperfections, it聽should be easier to bounce back when they arise.

It is one thing to accept that the philosophy gap聽is real, quite another to fill it. We have to start from聽where we are, and within the current remits of聽service provision, therapists cannot be expected聽to be allowed the luxury of exploring philosophical聽commitments at length. Nor can they all be expected聽to go away and study philosophy in depth. Time is a聽finite resource and I am not suggesting philosophy聽should always top the list of continuing professional聽development (CPD) priorities. I would recommend,聽however, that it is seen as a valuable CPD option.

At present, there are few courses of philosophy for聽therapists available. (The most notable exception to聽this is that philosophy is integral to the training in聽existential psychotherapy.) Therapists interested in聽drawing on the resources will often therefore need聽to curate their own training. The further reading is聽a good start. Even if you do not incorporate any聽philosophy into your practice, you might find it聽fills some of your own philosophy gap.

Dr Julian Baggini is the author, co-author or editor聽of over 20 books, including The Ego Trick, Freedom聽Regained (both Granta) and, most recently, A Short聽History of Truth (Quercus). He co-wrote The Shrink聽and The Sage column with Antonia Macaro in the聽FT Weekend magazine for five years and the聽book of the same name, published by Icon.聽

Acknowledgements

This article was in large parts the fruits聽of my collaboration and discussion with聽my partner, Antonia Macaro. Much of聽its contents are owed to her, although聽responsibility for its final form is entirely mine.

Further reading

Baggini J, Macaro A. The shrink and the sage.聽London: Icon; 2012.
Camus A. The myth of Sisyphus. Justin O鈥橞rien (trans).聽London: Penguin, 2000 [1942].
LeBon T. Wise therapy: philosophy for counsellors.聽London: Continuum; 2001.
Macaro A. Reason, virtue and psychotherapy.聽Chichester: John Wiley; 2006.
van Derzen E. Existential counselling and psychotherapy聽in practice (3rd edition). London: Sage; 2012.

References

1. National Institute of Mental Health (US)聽https://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/topics/depression/index.shtml (accessed 15 January 2018).
2. Camus A. The myth of Sisyphus. Justin O鈥橞rien (trans).聽London: Penguin: 2000 [1942].
3. De Botton A. The consolations of philosophy.聽London: Penguin; 2002.
4. Freud S, Breuer J. Studies on hysteria. Translated by聽Nicola Luckhurst. London: Penguin; 2004

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